John B. Judis, author of The Emerging Democratic Majority, has what might initially seem to be an intriguing article in the current issue of The New Republic. In it, he argues that something called “terror management theory” has a good deal to tell us about why George W. Bush won reelection in 2004. I say the article “initially seems” intriguing because it falls apart upon inspection. While I believe political psychology and neuropolitics are fruitful fields of endeavor — explaining, for instance, how different personality traits affect political orientation — this Judis article seems to me to be a case of a lot of fancy words and interesting experiments telling us next to nothing we didn’t already know.

The basic thesis Judis advances is that September 11 (and the Bush administration’s subsequent use and abuse of the memory of 9/11) led to Republican victories in 2002 and 2004 because “mere thought of one’s mortality can trigger a range of emotions–from disdain for other races, religions, and nations, to a preference for charismatic over pragmatic leaders, to a heightened attraction to traditional mores.” Racism, bigotry, nationalism, daddy-fixation, Bible-thumping… every liberal stereotype of conservatives is heightened by what a group of psychologists has dubbed “mortality salience.”

The effect certainly seems to exist. As recounted in the article, experiments have shown that subjects primed to contemplate their own mortality have shown a greater propensity to fear other races and religions, wish to impose harsher penalties for crimes, and seek a strong leader than subject who have not been so primed.

Nonetheless, what does any of this really tell us about Bush, 9/11, 2002, and 2004? According to Judis:

[The results of numerous experiments] strongly suggested that Bush’s popularity was sustained by mortality reminders. The psychologists concluded in a paper published after the election that the government terror warnings, the release of Osama bin Laden’s video on October 29, and the Bush campaign’s reiteration of the terrorist threat (Cheney on election eve: “If we make the wrong choice, then the danger is that we’ll get hit again”) were integral to Bush’s victory over Kerry. “From a terror management perspective,” they wrote, “the United States’ electorate was exposed to a wide-ranging multidimensional mortality salience induction.”

OK… But what has any of this told us that any political commentator in November of 2004 couldn’t have told us without aid of time-consuming studies and analysis conducted over several decades?

Yes, terrorism makes people scared, and this makes them seek out a strong leader. But why was President Bush so effective in presenting himself as that strong leader? Why couldn’t John Kerry effectively portray himself as a strong leader? While there are plenty of answers to such questions (Bush spent time at his ranch in Crawford, Kerry went windsurfing), none are enhanced by the psychological angle — they’re just common sense.

The one potentially interesting aspect of the psychological angle is that perhaps the entire Republican basket of issues was suddenly more attractive to voters — anti-abortion, anti-gay-marriage, anti-immigrant, etc. — after 9/11 because of mortality salience, but the Judis article does little to make such a case. Sure, Karl Rove tried to pump up the gay-marriage issue in a way never seen before in American politics. But A) the Massachusetts court decision started the ball rolling, and B) there’s no evidence the gay-marriage initiatives actually helped the GOP on balance. On immigration, Bush has long been at odds with his party’s base, favoring greater Hispanic immigration; he also refused to demonize Muslims after 9/11, even going out of his way to portray Islam as a “religion of peace,” much to the chagrin of his conservative supporters. Overall, I see little evidence that 9/11 shifted the culture in a conservative direction in a way that particularly benefited Bush.

The major problem with Judis’s article, however, would seem to be that it just doesn’t do much to account for 2006. Saying that the memory of 9/11 had faded and Katrina had tarnished Bush’s image as “protector” seems pretty thin. Once again, there’s not much here that goes beyond a conventional political analysis.

If the “9/11 led to cultural conservatism led to more votes for Bush” angle could be established more firmly, there’d be something here. As it stands, I don’t think the case is made.

Meanwhile, the end of the article gives away which candidate the author fears might repeat Bush’s political success coming into 2008:

Of course, there are still voters within the Republican electorate whose hearts beat to the rhythms of September 11 and who are still engaged in a passionate defense of their worldview. They continue to identify the war in Iraq with the war on terror; they worry about illegal aliens and terrorists crossing the border; some even judge the growing public opposition to Bush as further confirmation of his role as protector. These voters appear particularly attracted to Rudy Giuliani, whose entire campaign is based upon reminding voters of September 11. And, if Giuliani is the Republican nominee in 2008, the election may pivot on his ability to use reminders of September 11 to provoke the public into another massive bout of worldview defense.

Given the outcome of 2006, following the same-old Republican script probably wouldn’t be a good idea for any GOP candidate. Neuroscience or no.